Bill Dominguez v. Yahoo Inc by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-26-2018 
Bill Dominguez v. Yahoo Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Bill Dominguez v. Yahoo Inc" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 521. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/521 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
*Honorable Gerald J. Pappert, United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
                                          PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1243 
____________ 
 
BILL H. DOMINGUEZ, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF 
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
 
          Appellant 
     
v. 
 
YAHOO, INC.        
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01887) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson                   
                        
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 2, 2017 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ and ROTH*, Circuit Judges and 
PAPPERT, District Judge 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 26, 2018) 
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OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant Bill Dominguez sued Yahoo!, Inc., alleging 
that Yahoo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA)1 by sending him thousands of unsolicited text 
messages.  Dominguez now returns to this Court for the 
second time appealing the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Yahoo.  For the reasons stated below, 
we will affirm.   
 
I. 
The facts underlying this case are set forth at length in 
our prior opinion,2 and we provide only a brief recapitulation 
here.  Dominguez purchased a cell phone with a reassigned 
telephone number.  The prior owner of the number had 
subscribed to Yahoo’s Email SMS Service, through which a 
user would receive a text message each time an email was 
sent to the user’s Yahoo email account.  Because the prior 
owner of the number never canceled the subscription, 
Dominguez received a text message from Yahoo every time 
the prior owner received an email.  In an attempt to turn off 
the notifications, Dominguez pursued various courses of 
action, all of which proved unsuccessful.  Ultimately, 
                                                 
1 47 U.S.C. § 227.   
2 See Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 629 F. App’x 369 (3d Cir. 
2015).   
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Dominguez received approximately 27,800 text messages 
from Yahoo over the course of 17 months.   
 
Dominguez then filed a putative class action alleging 
that Yahoo had violated the TCPA.  Under the TCPA, it is 
unlawful to make or send a non-emergency call or text 
message “using any automatic telephone dialing system . . . to 
any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone 
service.”3  Thus, Dominguez’s lawsuit has always depended 
upon his assertion that Yahoo’s Email SMS Service was an 
“automatic telephone dialing system,” i.e., an autodialer.  The 
TCPA defines an autodialer as “equipment which has the 
capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 
called, using a random or sequential number generator; and 
(B) to dial such numbers.”4   
 
The District Court first granted summary judgment in 
favor of Yahoo in 2014 after concluding that the undisputed 
evidence demonstrated that the Email SMS Service did not 
have the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers 
using a random or sequential number generator.5  In 2015, 
while Dominguez’s appeal of that decision was pending, the 
FCC issued a declaratory ruling and order (the 2015 
Declaratory Ruling), which concluded that “the capacity of an 
                                                 
3 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).  Although the text of the 
statute refers only to “calls,” we have held that, under the 
TCPA, that term encompasses text messages.  See, e.g., 
Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 269 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2013).   
4 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).   
5 Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 637, 643-44 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014).   
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autodialer is not limited to its current configuration but also 
includes its potential functionalities.”6  In other words, a 
device could qualify as an autodialer under the TCPA if it had 
the latent or potential capacity to store or produce telephone 
numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and 
to dial those numbers.  In light of this intervening ruling from 
the FCC, we vacated the District Court’s judgment and 
remanded the case for further consideration.7  On remand, 
Dominguez amended his complaint to allege that the Email 
SMS Service “ha[d] the potential capacity to place autodialed 
calls.”8  Yahoo again moved for summary judgment, and both 
parties submitted expert reports addressing the Email SMS 
Service’s latent or potential capacity.    
 
The District Court granted Yahoo’s motion to exclude 
Dominguez’s expert reports and once again granted summary 
judgment in favor of Yahoo.9  As relevant to the present 
appeal, the court concluded that (1) the 2015 Declaratory 
Ruling should not apply in this case under principles of 
retroactivity, (2) under the applicable “present capacity” 
standard, the Email SMS Service did not qualify as an 
autodialer, (3) in the alternative, even if the 2015 Declaratory 
Ruling were applicable in this case, Dominguez had not 
presented any evidence that the Email SMS Service had the 
latent or potential capacity to generate random numbers 
                                                 
6 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (2015 Declaratory Ruling), 
30 FCC Rcd. 7991, 7974 ¶ 16 (2015).   
7 Dominguez, 629 F. App’x at 373.   
8 App. at 116 (Am. Compl.).   
9 Dominguez v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 13-1887, 2017 WL 390267, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017).   
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because Dominguez’s expert reports did not satisfy the 
standard for admissibility under Daubert, and (4) even if 
Dominguez’s expert reports were admissible, Dominguez had 
failed to provide evidence that the Email SMS Service was 
capable of both generating random and sequential numbers 
and dialing those numbers.  Dominguez appealed.   
 
While this appeal was pending, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its 
opinion in ACA International v. FCC,10 a case involving 
consolidated challenges to the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory 
Ruling.  The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC had exceeded its 
authority by interpreting the term “capacity” to include any 
latent or potential capacity and described the FCC’s approach 
as “utterly unreasonable in the breadth of its regulatory 
[in]clusion.”11  In particular, the D.C. Circuit took issue with 
the fact that “a straightforward reading of the [FCC’s] ruling 
invites the conclusion that all smartphones are autodialers.”12  
This was so because, as the FCC had conceded, any ordinary 
smartphone could achieve autodialer functionality by simply 
downloading a random-number-generating app.13  The D.C. 
Circuit therefore set aside the FCC’s 2015 Declaratory 
Ruling.14   
 
                                                 
10 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018).   
11 Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original).   
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 696-97.   
14 Id. at 692.   
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II.15 
 The decision in ACA International has narrowed the 
scope of this appeal.16  In light of the D.C. Circuit’s holding, 
we interpret the statutory definition of an autodialer as we did 
prior to the issuance of 2015 Declaratory Ruling.  Dominguez 
can no longer rely on his argument that the Email SMS 
Service had the latent or potential capacity to function as 
autodialer.  The only remaining question, then, is whether 
Dominguez provided evidence to show that the Email SMS 
Service had the present capacity to function as autodialer.   
 
 Three of Dominguez’s expert reports offer nothing to 
help resolve the present capacity question.  Both the 
Krishnamurthy Report and the Christensen Report focus on 
                                                 
15 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment, 
and make all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 
62 (3d Cir. 2013).  We review a District Court’s decision to 
exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.  Pineda 
v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).  This 
means that “[w]e will not interfere with the district court’s 
decision ‘unless there is a definite and firm conviction that 
the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant 
factors.’”  Id. (quoting In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).   
16 Dominguez and Yahoo have both submitted letters under 
Rule 28(j) explaining their understanding of the impact of 
ACA International on this appeal.   
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latent or potential capacity.  The Krishnamurthy Report 
proposes five possible ways in which the Email SMS Service 
could be modified to generate random or sequential 
numbers.17  All of these proposed modifications would 
require several months of work to implement.18  The 
Christensen Report is similarly speculative.  Christensen 
opines that “[i]t would have been quite easy for one of normal 
skill in software programming to configure an application to 
cause mobile messages to be sent based on integration of off-
the-shelf, commonly available random number generator 
programs,” and concludes that “the equipment and systems 
that Yahoo relied upon . . . had the latent capacity to generate 
random and/or sequential ten digit numbers.”19  A third 
report, by Jeffrey Hansen, does not use the term “latent 
capacity” but presents similar analysis.  The Hansen Report 
begins with the generalized assertion that “all computers can 
generate random or sequential numbers.”20  The report then 
proposes six computer code commands, which, Hansen 
asserts, could be written into Yahoo’s operating system in 
order to generate wireless numbers randomly or 
sequentially.21   
 
In his supplemental filings, Dominguez argues that, 
under ACA International, certain limited modifications may 
nevertheless fall within the scope of present capacity.  He 
emphasizes the D.C. Circuit’s comment that “[v]irtually any 
understanding of ‘capacity’ thus contemplates some future 
                                                 
17 See App. at 306 (Krishnamurthy Report). 
18 See App. at 304, 321 (Krishnamurthy Report).   
19 App. at 1163, 1165 (Christensen Report) (emphasis added).   
20 App. at 372 (Hansen Report).   
21 App. at 373 (Hansen Report).   
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functioning state, along with some modifying act to bring that 
state about.”22  Though that may be true, it does not follow 
that the Krishnamurthy, Christensen, or Hansen Reports 
create a triable factual issue regarding the present capacity of 
the Email SMS Service.  The reports are founded upon the 
exact type of hypothesizing that is foreclosed by ACA 
International. 23  The District Court was therefore correct to 
exclude the Krishnamurthy, Christensen, and Hansen Reports, 
as they are irrelevant to the present capacity inquiry.24   
                                                 
22 Rule 28(j) Letter from James A. Francis, Appellant’s 
Counsel, to Patricia Dodszuweit, Clerk of Court, 3d Cir. 
(Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 696).   
23 ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 696.  The D.C. Circuit noted that a 
correct understanding of “capacity” focuses “on 
considerations such as how much is required to enable the 
device to function as an autodialer: does it require the simple 
flipping of a switch, or does it require essentially a top-to-
bottom reconstruction of the equipment?”  Id.  The types of 
modifications discussed by the Krishnamurthy and 
Christensen Reports—involving several months of work and 
the integration of unnamed external programs or 
applications—can hardly be characterized as the “simple 
flipping of a switch” and are far closer to a full reconstruction 
of the Email SMS System.  Although the modification 
proposed in the Hansen Report appears simpler in 
comparison, the addition of a short sequence of code to any 
computer operating system bears a striking similarity to the 
downloading of an app onto any smartphone—the 
modification that was at issue in  
ACA International.  See id. at 696-98.   
24 Cf., e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 591 (1993) (“Rule 702 further requires that the evidence 
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Dominguez’s final expert report, the supplemental 
declaration of Randall Snyder, also falls short of the 
admissibility standard.  Snyder purports to address present, 
not just latent, capacity, repeatedly opining that “Yahoo’s 
Email SMS Service system had the ability to generate random 
numbers and, in fact, did generate random numbers.”25  This 
opinion, however, is supported by little more than the same 
type of overbroad, generalized assertions found in the Hansen 
Report.  Specifically, Snyder opines that “[t]he ability to 
generate random numbers is a fundamental function inherent 
in information technology computer systems employing the 
most common operating systems, security protocols and 
encryption.”26  Snyder goes on to explain the role that random 
number generators play in various commonly available 
computer operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows, 
Apple Mac OS, and UNIX, and posits that “it is a 
straightforward and very basic algorithm to use the available 
random number generation functions to generate ten-digit 
telephone numbers.”27  Notably absent, however, is any 
explanation of how the Email SMS System actually did or 
could generate random telephone numbers to dial.  In that 
                                                                                                             
or testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue. . . .  Expert testimony which 
does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, 
ergo, non-helpful.”).  Although the District Court, not having 
the guidance of ACA International, focused its analysis 
primarily on reliability, we may affirm on any basis supported 
in the record.  See, e.g., Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 
525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).   
25 App. at 977 (Snyder Supp. Decl.); see also id. at 978.   
26 App. at 974 (Snyder Supp. Decl.).  
27 App. at 976 (Snyder Supp. Decl.). 
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regard, the Snyder Supplemental Declaration is hardly less 
speculative than the expert reports of Krishnamurthy, 
Christensen, or Hansen—and raises the same concerns about 
the TCPA’s breadth that the D.C. Circuit addressed in ACA 
International.  Because it does not shed light on the key 
factual question actually at issue in this case—whether the 
Email SMS System functioned as an autodialer by randomly 
or sequentially generating telephone numbers, and dialing 
those numbers—the Snyder Supplemental Declaration, like 
the other expert reports, lacks fit or relevance and was 
therefore properly excluded.28   
 
Ultimately, Dominguez cannot point to any evidence 
that creates a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Email 
SMS Service had the present capacity to function as an 
autodialer by generating random or sequential telephone 
numbers and dialing those numbers.  On the contrary, the 
record indicates that the Email SMS Service sent messages 
only to numbers that had been individually and manually 
inputted into its system by a user.29  There can be little doubt 
that Dominguez suffered great annoyance as a result of the 
unwanted text messages.  But those messages were sent 
precisely because the prior owner of Dominguez’s telephone 
number had affirmatively opted to receive them, not because 
of random number generation.  The TCPA’s prohibition on 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 
743 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A]dmissibility depends in part on the 
proffered connection between the scientific research or test 
result to be presented and particular disputed factual issues in 
the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra 
note 24.   
29 See App. at 248-49 (Decl. of Gareth Shue).   
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autodialers is therefore not the proper means of redress.  
 
III. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders excluding Dominguez’s expert reports and 
granting summary judgment in favor of Yahoo.   
  
 
 
 
